General Birdwood - Greg's War

A Visit from the ‘Top Brass’

For 12 July 1918, Greg’s diary entry includes this:

General Birdwood came round in the morning (commanding 5th Army) and spoke to us all.  Seemed a nice chap.

For many readers in the 21^st century, the notion that on the Western Front the soldiers were ‘lions led by donkeys’ is well entrenched. That was not necessarily the view, either on the battlefields or on the Home Front, in 1918 and in fact did not become the prevailing popular view until the growth in readership of the poets of the First World War (compulsory on some GCSE syllabuses), the impact of the play/film, ‘Oh, What A Lovely War!’ (1963/1969), and the popularity of the BBC TV show ‘Blackadder Goes Forth’ (1989). For historians, the attributes and achievements of the senior officers on the Western Front have been subject to lively debates, leading to rather different evaluations, ranging from them being characterised as ‘unimaginative products of their training and careers of conformism’, to ‘doing the best they could with the means and expertise at their disposal’, to ‘men who learned very hard lessons through bitter experience’, to ‘despite their professional or personal shortcomings, the men who oversaw victory’. Notwithstanding these important debates, the senior officers of 1918 still had to develop and maintain relationships – and reputations – amongst not only their immediate entourages and staffs, but more widely across the forces, whether Corps, Division or Army, over which they held command. As such, a visit by the ‘top brass’ was (and remains) an occasion for special preparations as well as an opportunity for personnel nearer the front lines to show ‘things as they really are’.[1]

Noblesse Oblige

Within the British army on the Western Front, there was a strongly held view that officers of all ranks owed a ‘duty of care’ to their subordinates in terms of their welfare, as much as of their training and leadership. During the century after Waterloo the army had developed an ethos of noblesse oblige, or ‘country house’ relationships in which obedience and respect were exchanged for care and support.[2] This notion came under pressure during the horrors of the trenches, not least because the officer corps was enormously enlarged and necessarily drew in a much broader cross-section of British society than in peacetime,[3] yet the notion survived.

As a new service, demanding specialised technological expertise from those on the ground and enormous personal courage from those in the air, the infant Royal Air Force in which 2/Lt Gregory was serving might have been expected to have stood aside from the conventions of hosting the ‘top brass’, or at least to have accorded the honour to its own higher ranks. Indeed, Trenchard’s visit to front-line squadrons in France in early April 1918 provided crucial information with which he briefed the Prime Minister (Lloyd George) and others about the contribution of air power to stemming the German Spring Offensives.[4] The visit of General Sir William Birdwood (as he then was) to 42 Squadron may therefore seem rather puzzling.

Gen. Birdwood — General Sir William Riddell Birdwood by Elliott & Fry (Public domain)

Birdwood[5] had only recently (31 May) taken command of the Fifth Army, which was being re-constituted in the aftermath of the serious British reverses in the first days of the German Spring Offensives. Despite its designation as ‘Fifth’, Birdwood’s new command was rather different to that which had fought so desperately against the Germans in March, and his story gives some insight into the cross-currents of political, military, personal and inter-Allied pressures at work at senior levels.

The New Fifth

The Fifth Army of March 1918 was, in effect, dissolved as its commander, Gough,[6] was blamed in particular by politicians for the near-disaster of the German advance. Despite being one of Haig’s favourites, Gough was ousted on 28 March, and on 2 April his former command was re-designated Fourth Army, under Rawlinson.[7] Gough and his staff were withdrawn from the front line, to the face-saving work of creating a defensive line to the rear where a Reserve Army was to be created. It was this Reserve Army that was re-designated the Fifth in late May. Birdwood was at that time commanding the Anzacs, and his appointment to Fifth Army was not one that he sought. He managed, however, to retain his connections with the Anzacs, and also to take with him to Fifth Army his most talented staff. His task, in effect, was to raise to operational readiness in the shortest possible time the latest drafts of soldiers from Britain, whether teenagers[8] or those ‘combed out’ of reserve occupations,[9] to meet the desperate shortage of manpower on the Western Front, as the German offensives continued to press the Allies hard.

Birdwood and Haig

Although a contemporary of Haig at Sandhurst, and both originally cavalrymen whose careers advanced through patronage and staff appointments, Birdwood recalled that he and ‘the Chief’ were of different generations,[10] and they were certainly of different temperaments. Modern scholars have remarked upon their relationship, as follows.

Other than Allenby, Birdwood appears to have been the one among his army commanders whom Haig most disliked, probably through Birdwood’s connections to Kitchener. Birdwood himself was no great admirer of Haig but ‘largely unwilling to stand up to his superiors’.[11]

Birdwood had prospered as a protégé of Kitchener, from the 2^nd Boer War through service in India, and by 1914 had attained the rank of Major-General, membership of the Viceroy’s Legislative Council, and the office of Secretary of the Indian Army Department. It was Kitchener who gave Birdwood the job for which perhaps he is now most remembered, to create and command the Anzac forces, firstly into action at Gallipoli and subsequently on the Western Front. It is worth quoting the view of Australian scholars, at length. Amongst the Anzacs,

‘Birdie’s’ serene courage won the admiration of all. His concern for the soldiers and his fighting spirit became important factors in Anzac morale. Robert Rhodes James[12] states that his popularity ‘was something of a newspaper myth’ and quotes an unnamed Australian observer: ‘He bored the men and they bored him’. Charles Bean,[13] who saw Birdwood at close quarters throughout the war, does not confirm this view; nor does Birdwood’s enthusiastic reception by Australians in London on Anzac Day 1916, nor his triumphal progress around Australia and New Zealand in 1920. Whatever the extent of his popularity, there is no doubt of the respect in which he was held for his courage and his example. In Hamilton’s[14] memorable phrase, he was ‘the soul of Anzac’.

…Birdwood’s policy was to appoint Australians to commands and staffs,… By 31 May 1918, when he handed over the corps to Lieutenant-General Sir John Monash,[15] whom he had recommended as his successor, only one British officer remained in a senior command. Birdwood,.. went to command the Fifth Army much against his own wishes; he took White[16] as chief of staff and to advise in Australian matters, as he still retained command of the A.I.F. Although most Australian generals supported this arrangement, there was strong opposition from Bean and (Sir) Keith Murdoch,[17] the journalist and confidant of W. M. Hughes;[18] they argued that Monash should command the A.I.F. and White the corps as, in their view, Birdwood could not command a British army and efficiently administer the A.I.F. In August Hughes offered Birdwood the administrative command full time and he accepted, while obtaining Hughes’s agreement to his remaining with his army until 30 November.

…Birdwood’s success as a commander lay in the field of leadership rather than in tactics or organization. Nevertheless he was careful to choose able subordinates and the quality of his staffs was high. His choice of White, widely regarded as the outstanding Australian officer, strengthened his position in dealing with the Australians as well as with higher authority. If he lacked the tactical flair and imagination of General Allenby, he was a very competent professional who set and obtained high standards. In view of the reputation of the Australian Corps when he left it in May 1918, he must be accorded his share of the credit for creating so illustrious a force. Throughout the war he kept up a valuable correspondence not only with the governor-general, the prime minister and the minister for defence but also with bereaved or anxious families in Australia. He also wrote to officers who had been decorated or promoted. When Field Marshal Haig told White that he should command the corps, White’s reply was significant: ‘God forbid! General Birdwood has a position among Australians which is far too valuable to lose’.[19]

But, as remarked by one of Haig’s recent biographers,

Haig thought little of Birdwood as a general, and his promotion to command Fifth Army in 1918 may have owed something to Haig’s desire to promote Monash to command the Australian Corps.[20]

Haig’s preference for Monash seems to have derived from Haig’s belief that the Australian was at once an enthusiast for the ‘breakthrough’ rather than the ‘bite and hold’[21] developed by British officers, and from Monash’s apparent ability to create and implement highly detailed plans for his forces and resources. Modern historians have also thought it worthy of note that, notwithstanding Haig’s sharing in many of the prejudices of his (Victorian) era, Haig was not prejudiced against Monash, despite the latter being of German-Jewish parentage, a colonial and not a professional soldier,[22] any one of which characteristics might have been enough to destroy a man’s rise to a senior role in this period.

In several key respects, the outcome of the struggle on the Western Front did turn on such foibles of character, prejudices and preconceptions of the commanders, whether it be (on the German side) Ludendorff’s contempt for all civilian politicians, or the rivalries between Foch and each of his subordinate commanders especially Pétain, or Pershing’s determination to maintain the independence of the US military contribution, or how well (Allied) commanders were able to maintain good relationships with their national politicians. Birdwood was, in many ways, an ideal commander: careful to remain ‘onside’ with politicians, keen to promote talent wherever he found it and to demonstrate concern for the welfare of his soldiers. Unfortunately, he was also typical of his peers in that he lacked creativity as a fighting general, as had been demonstrated by his determination not only to ‘hang on’ at Gallipoli but also to attack Turkish positions in extremely adverse circumstances. In all these ways, he closely resembled Haig.

Why the Visit?

So, why did Birdwood visit 42 Squadron, at that particular date? On the one hand, Birdwood had established his headquarters at Upen d’Aval, less than 10 miles by road (closer as the RE8 flies) to Rely and 42 Squadron. A visit was thus a relatively easy, half-day outing. Birdwood’s style with the Anzacs had been to see and be seen by all ranks, perhaps originating in his need to mould into an effective fighting force the original Anzac volunteers, who did not necessarily accept the obligation to obey without question. The same style may have been helpful with the newly-arrived drafts to Fifth Army who were also new to military discipline. Further, the British Army ‘establishment’ fully recognised the vital work of the aerial/artillery collaboration, which it was essential to maintain especially now that the RAF was formally a separate armed force.

On the other hand, whilst Birdwood was “a nice chap”, his “popularity engendered a good deal of suspicion in Haig, who suspected that Birdwood achieved popularity at the expense of discipline.”[23] Also, by this point in July, it was by no means clear in what direction the tide of war on the Western Front was moving. Allied intelligence, both French and British, expected a further massive German assault, but was unable to determine precisely where the blow – probably blows – would fall. Such was the level of concern that, “Clemenceau’s War Committee discussed the evacuation of the capital [Paris]; in London the Admiralty briefed the War Office on the mass embarkation of British troops ‘in certain eventualities…’.”[24] It was by no means apparent at this stage that a further German offensive would not achieve results similar to – or worse than – those seen in Operation ‘Michael’. Birdwood’s preparations for the anticipated assault might reasonably include raising morale amongst those nearer the front lines, but surely there were several parts to his responsibility of ensuring that his Fifth Army would not suffer the fate of Gough’s Fifth.

References

[1] There are, however, competing judgements on this. On the one hand, “It can be noted,.. that, whatever the command style, most army commanders were increasingly seen at the front visiting commanders and units as the war continued,….”

(eds) I F W Beckett & S J Corvi Haig’s Generals (Barnsley, 2009) introduction. On the other hand, “References to Haig or any other general in the letters and diaries of ordinary soldiers are sparse,” Gary Sheffield The Chief. Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, 2011) p.142.

[2] This was not necessarily the view prevailing in the armies of the dominions or empire: notoriously, amongst Australian soldiers their officers’ personal qualities as leaders were far more important in the development of unit cohesion and esprit de corps. For a debate on this, see J G Fuller Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1991).

[3] “In August 1914, there were 28,060 officers in the British Army, of which 12,738 were regular officers, the rest were in the reserves. The number of officers in the army had increased to 164,255 by November 1918. These were survivors among the 247,061 officers who had been granted a commission during the war.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Army_during_World_War_I

[4] The newly-knighted Sir Hugh Trenchard (1873-1956), who then resigned as first Chief of the Air Staff at the height of operation ‘Michael’ as the outcome of his deep disagreements with his ‘boss’, the Air Minister Lord Rothermere, over air strategy.

[5] Field Marshal William Riddell Birdwood, 1st Baron Birdwood, GCB, GCSI, GCMG, GCVO, CIE, DSO (1865 – 1951).

[6] General Sir Hubert de la Poer Gough GCB, GCMG, KCVO (1870 – 1963), whose brother, Brig-Gen Sir John Gough, had been awarded the VC for his courage under fire as a brevet Major, in 1903. He was killed by a sniper in 1915.

[7] General Henry Seymour Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson, GCB, GCSI, GCVO, KCMG (1864 – 1925), known as Sir Henry Rawlinson, 2nd Baronet between 1895 and 1919.

[8] “Men aged 18½ were sent to the fronts starting in March 1918, violating a pledge to keep them safe until [aged] 19.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recruitment_to_the_British_Army_during_the_First_World_War

[9] ‘Combing out’ was the procedure whereby those in reserved occupations had their designation reviewed in an effort to identify more men for combat, and was much opposed by trades unions. The crisis of manpower, beginning in late 1917, is described at http://www.longlongtrail.co.uk/battles/the-british-armys-manpower-crisis-of-1918/

[10] Haig was four years older and an Oxford graduate, whilst Birdwood came to Sandhurst from school at Clifton College (Sheffield The Chief, p.18).

[11] (Eds) Beckett & Corvi Haig’s Generals, introduction.

[12] Sir Robert Rhodes James (1933 – 99), historian and sometime MP for Cambridge. This is presumably a reference to his Gallipoli (orig. London, 1965).

[13] Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean (1879 – 1968), Australian WW1 war correspondent, later Editor of the 12-volume Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918.

[14] General Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton, GCB, GCMG, DSO, TD (1853 – 1947), army commander for the first phase of the Dardanelles campaign.

[15] General Sir John Monash, GCMG, KCB, VD (1865 – 1931). He was knighted on the battlefield in August 1918, by George V.

[16] General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham White, KCB, KCMG, KCVO, DSO (1876 –1940).

[17] (1885 – 1952), father of Rupert…. “nuf said,” as Nigel Molesworth would have it.

[18] ‘Billy’ Hughes, CH, KC (1862 – 1952), seventh Prime Minister of Australia, in office 1915-23.

[19] A J Hill, writing in the Australian Dictionary of Biography http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/birdwood-william-riddell-baron-birdwood-5240

[20] Sheffield, The Chief, p.138.

[21] Although the coinage is attributed to Rawlinson, the method of engaging the enemy in incremental steps was supported by White, in contrast to Monash.

[22] Monash was a graduate engineer and lawyer, whose military service was, although of long-standing, in the reserves, in Victoria, until 1915.

[23] http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/birdwood.htm Although, as it states on this website, “A word of caution however; this is by no means an academic website. It’s authored as spare time permits and is geared towards a general rather than scholarly readership. Given this, it is not recommended that this site be used for academic reference purposes for school or university papers. This does not so much indicate a concerning lack of authorial confidence in the accuracy of site content as an acknowledgement that material on the site has not been submitted for formal peer review.”

[24] David Stevenson ‘With our backs to the Wall’ Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London, 2011), p.108. In mid-July, French aerial reconnaissance provided important forewarning of German concentrations for an assault on Reims, ibid. p.109.